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Abstract 
 
  
We show that lenders join a U.S. commercial credit bureau when information asymmetries 
between incumbents and entrants create an adverse selection problem that hinders market entry. 
Lenders also delay joining when information asymmetries protect them from competition in 
existing markets, consistent with lenders trading off new market entry against heightened 
competition. We exploit shocks to information coverage to show that lenders enter new markets 
after joining the bureau in a pattern consistent with this trade-off. Our results illuminate why 
intermediaries voluntarily share information and show how financial technology that mitigates 
information asymmetries can shape the boundaries of lending. 
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1. Introduction 
Advances in technology have changed the way financial intermediaries use and share 
information. In most modern credit markets, lenders exchange contract terms and delinquency 
records through sharing arrangements (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007). Many of these 
arrangements operate voluntarily through private credit bureaus in the largest credit markets. 
Private bureaus provide near universal coverage of individuals in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and Canada, while mandated credit registries are negligible in these 
markets (World Bank 2016).   
Sharing information reduces information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, 
which aids screening and monitoring, improves the match between lenders and borrowers, and 
enhances access to credit for creditworthy borrowers (Padilla and Pagano 1997). However, 
because these same features increase competition for borrowers, lenders may prefer not to share 
information (Pagano and Jappelli 1993). In this paper, we study when lenders decide to 
voluntarily share information and how their expansion is aided by shared information.   
Because few settings allow researchers to observe the decision to share information or 
lender behavior before and after sharing, the motives and consequences of this sharing are not 
well understood. Our study uses data from the PayNet credit bureau, which includes the 
equipment finance contracts of 207 lenders joining in a staggered pattern between 2001 and 
2014. PayNet filled a gap in the U.S. commercial credit market, where, unlike in consumer 
credit, lenders had no access to historical loan performance data from other lenders. A novel 
feature of the PayNet data is that members must share both ongoing and past contracts, 
allowing us to track lenders’ exposures before and after sharing.  
We show that, although the threat of competition deters information sharing, lenders 
have incentives to share when doing so can reduce adverse selection problems that inhibit entry 
to competitive credit markets. Lenders that enter the bureau earlier face greater adverse 
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selection and entry barriers ex-ante in the potential (or equivalently, “new”) markets into which 
they can expand. Early entrants also have fewer informational rents to lose by sharing because 
adverse selection is lower ex ante in their existing (equivalently, “home”) markets. In tests 
examining the expansion dynamics of members, we confirm that lenders rely on bureau 
information to expand in new markets with higher adverse selection. 
Our evidence on the sharing decision can be understood through the lens of Pagano and 
Jappelli (1993). They argue that lenders should be more likely to share information when the 
benefits of sharing—a reduction in information asymmetry—are high or the costs—the threat 
of increased competition—are low. We frame our results on how information asymmetries 
between lenders in new and existing markets affect when lenders join the bureau by building 
on Dell’Ariccia, Friedman, and Marquez (1999), Dell’Ariccia (2001), and Marquez (2002). 
They explore how information asymmetries between informed incumbents and uninformed 
entrants affect the structure of credit markets and highlight that information sharing can 
mitigate the adverse selection problems associated with expansion. Intuitively, our results show 
that lenders delay sharing to protect existing markets where they can extract informational rents 
and share earlier when they seek to enter markets where adverse selection is high.  
 Our first set of tests investigates the market, lender, and bureau characteristics that 
influence lenders’ decisions to join PayNet. For market characteristics, we estimate lender 
concentration, credit growth, and delinquency rates in each market to capture the adverse 
selection facing entrants, due to incumbents’ proprietary information on borrowers, which 
gives them an information advantage when competing for borrowers. Entrants face greater 
adverse selection when proprietary information is concentrated among fewer incumbents and 
when incumbents have more proprietary information on the loan application pool, either 
because new credit demand is low or past delinquencies are high (Dell’Ariccia et al. 1999; 
Dell’Ariccia 2001; Marquez 2002). 
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We define a credit market as the intersection of one of 23 collateral types and one of 
nine U.S. census regions. Thus, a lender’s potential collateral-region markets are the collateral 
type x U.S. region pairs where the lender does not have exposure prior to sharing. We focus on 
collateral types because equipment finance lenders often specialize by type, rather than by 
industry, given the similarities in contract terms, default probabilities, resale markets, and 
enforcement mechanisms within an asset class (Carey et al. 1998; Benmelech et al. 2005; 
Eisfeldt and Rampini 2009; Murfin and Pratt 2017).1  
We show that early PayNet participants face lower concentration in existing markets, 
and higher concentration, higher delinquency, and lower growth rates in potential markets. As 
the bureau grows, we find that those lenders with initial higher home market concentration and 
lower potential market concentration enter. We then examine how lender characteristics affect 
the entry decision. Those employing lending technology that relies less on private information, 
such as lenders that are larger or more diversified (Loutskina and Strahan 2011; Berger et al. 
2017), enter sooner.2 Specialized lenders, possessing specific expertise in evaluating credit 
risks and collecting proprietary information, enter the bureau later. Last, we study bureau 
characteristics and show that the decision to enter is positively correlated with the breadth of 
membership in the lender’s existing markets, consistent with bureau reputation and lenders’ 
strategic actions influencing the entry decision.  
 Our second set of tests use detailed contract-level data to examine whether lenders 
expand after bureau entry in a pattern consistent with the motives for information sharing. We 
start by examining whether lenders expand into new geographic markets within the collateral 
types they specialize prior to joining the bureau. To separate the effect of information sharing 
                                                 
1 For example, captives such as Caterpillar, John Deere, IBM, and Volvo are among the 10 largest lenders in the 
equipment finance market, while others lend against computers, copiers, forklifts, or trucks to an array of 
industries (Monitor 2015). 
2 Throughout we use “lending technology” to describe the combination of screening and monitoring practices, 
reliance on private and public information, and organizational hierarchy that shape how a lender makes credit 
decisions (Stein 2002; Berger et al. 2005; Liberti and Mian 2009; Loutskina and Strahan 2011). 
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on lending from the endogenous decision to join, our empirical design exploits the staggered 
entry of lenders and employs within lender-quarter estimation to identify how members’ 
exposures respond to market-level shocks in information coverage stemming from new 
member entry. Of course, these shocks in coverage may be correlated with demand shocks. 
The second piece of our identification strategy is to compare lending patterns of incumbent 
lenders with those of nonmembers around the entry of new lenders through the inclusion of 
collateral type-region-quarter fixed effects. Hence, we can examine how a member’s exposure 
in a particular collateral type-region-quarter responds to an information shock, due to the new 
entrant, while absorbing the contemporaneous change in exposure in the same collateral type-
region for the counterfactual nonmember. 
Our identification strategy is perhaps best illustrated with an example. Consider the 
exposures of the following lenders, A and B, which both finance agricultural equipment. 
Lender A joins the bureau in 2004, and Lender B joins in 2008. Now consider a third lender, 
C, specializing in agricultural equipment, which enters in 2006. We predict a larger change in 
agricultural equipment exposure in 2007 for Lender A, which observes the new information 
from Lender C in the bureau, than Lender B, which is not yet a member. To the extent that the 
agricultural equipment lending divisions of Lenders A and B are exposed to similar economic 
shocks, the differential increase in agricultural equipment lending around Lender C joining the 
bureau can be attributed to information sharing. We also observe a natural placebo in our 
setting: Lender A’s exposures in non-agricultural collateral types (e.g., copiers) should not 
respond to information coverage shocks originating from Lender C joining. 
We find that members increase their exposures in a collateral type-region in response 
to new lenders sharing information in the bureau but only when the coverage shock is relevant 
to that collateral type-region. A one standard deviation increase in the number of bureau 
contracts for a typical collateral type-region increases a member’s credit exposure to that same 
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collateral type-region by 7.4%. By comparison, we detect no change in nonmembers’ 
exposures, and, in placebo tests, we show that members’ exposures to a given collateral type-
region do not respond to shocks to coverage in other collateral type-regions. Together, these 
results indicate that expansion is being driven by the availability of information in the bureau, 
rather than by unobservable lender business-model changes or conditions in collateral markets.  
To reinforce our earlier findings on the sharing decision, we show that the relation 
between a lender’s expansion and information coverage is stronger in new markets, especially 
those with high concentration where entrants face greater information barriers ex-ante. The 
results illustrate that information sharing allows lenders to expand in markets consistent with 
adverse selection hindering market entry.   
Next, we examine whether members expand into related collateral types post 
information sharing. Lenders can protect themselves from heightened competition by focusing 
on core markets and developing expertise (Boot and Thakor 2000; Hauswald and Marquez 
2006). Since collateral expertise is instrumental to screening and monitoring in our setting, we 
expect lenders to enter new collateral markets that share screening and monitoring technologies 
with their existing ones. We construct an index measuring the degree of relatedness between 
each pair of collateral types by identifying the pairs most commonly found together in lenders’ 
portfolios.3 Intuitively, the index captures how similar two collateral types are in terms of 
screening and monitoring technologies. For example, it shows that telecommunications 
equipment relates highly to computer and copy equipment but not to railroad and logging 
equipment. We find that lenders, on average, enter new collateral markets that most closely 
resemble their existing collateral exposures. Information sharing strengthens this effect, 
suggesting that sharing accelerates entry into related collateral markets.  
                                                 
3 The literature employs similar techniques to study how across-firm linkages explain productivity (Conley and 
Dupor 2003), the propagation of microeconomic shocks (di Giovanni et al. 2014), and diversification (Teece et 
al. 1994; Bryce and Winter 2009; Boehm et al. 2016). 
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To build on our results showing that small and specialized lenders join the bureau later, 
we also examine whether lenders’ expansion patterns vary by their lending technologies. We 
show that small and specialized lenders expand credit more than large and diversified ones, 
respectively, but that larger lenders increase contracting with small firms after joining.  
The results highlight important differences in the way lending technology interacts with 
information sharing. Small and specialized lenders typically invest in private information, 
employ monitoring technologies specific to a given collateral type, and possess competitive 
advantages in markets where borrower information is predominantly soft, such as for small 
firms (Stein 2002; Chen et al. 2017; Liberti and Petersen 2017). However, this technology may 
not transfer across markets, and therefore small and specialized lenders may face barriers to 
entry in the absence of information sharing. Large lenders, in contrast, which rely more on hard 
information, face significant barriers to contracting with smaller borrowers. PayNet provides 
access to information on small borrowers from small lenders, which reduces the need to collect 
private information and enables larger lenders to expand credit to these borrowers. 
One implication of our results is that borrowers should have easier access to specialized 
lenders, which should improve their access to credit. Consistent with this, we show that, after 
a borrower first has a credit file in the bureau, this borrower increases its number of 
relationships by 6.0% and credit by 11.8%. We then show that access to specialized lenders 
enhances financial flexibility. Borrowers are more likely to start “off-cycle” relationships, as 
opposed to starting new relationships only upon the conclusion of old contracts. These results 
also suggest that lenders do not collude in protecting their own relationships. 
To our knowledge, our study provides the first direct evidence on why lenders 
voluntarily share information. There is a lack of evidence on voluntary information sharing, 
despite continued growth in sharing among financial intermediaries in most markets. Prior 
work has focused on how competition shapes incentives to share information but has been 
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limited to studying cross-country aggregate correlations between information sharing and 
competition (Bruhn, Fazari, and Kanz 2013) or providing evidence from an experimental credit 
market (Brown and Zehnder 2010).  
We also contribute to the literature exploring the scope of lenders’ exposures, by 
showing how technological improvements that reduce information asymmetries can shape the 
boundaries of lending.4 Our evidence is consistent with specialization fostering a comparative 
advantage in screening and monitoring (Winton, 1999), which lenders leverage to access new 
credit markets when adverse selection is reduced through information sharing, in contrast to 
the traditional model of delegated monitoring in which banks diversify (Diamond 1984; Boyd 
and Prescott 1986). 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
We study when lenders choose to join a credit bureau to share information, and how 
doing so aids their expansion. We argue that information asymmetry affects the structure of 
credit markets, by creating an adverse selection problem that acts as an entry barrier to new 
lenders. Sharing information can reduce this adverse selection problem. Theoretical research 
allows us to formulate hypotheses on the timing of lenders’ decisions to share information and 
bureau members’ lending dynamics.   
Asymmetric information is a defining characteristic of credit markets. Lenders face 
uncertainty about a borrower’s creditworthiness because they cannot observe some of the 
borrower’s characteristics and actions. Over time, lenders alleviate these informational 
problems by collecting proprietary information. Borrowers then can become informationally 
captured by their lenders, limiting the degree to which new lenders can compete for their 
                                                 
4 Economists have long studied the boundaries of the firm, but there is abundantly more evidence from industrial 
than credit markets (e.g., Berger and Ofek 1995; Rajan et al. 2000; Campa and Kedia 2002), despite considerable 
regulatory scrutiny of lenders’ portfolio concentrations (Basel 2000; OCC 2011). 
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business. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) show that, in such a market, lenders have incentives 
to build market share in anticipation of future informational rents.  
Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999), Dell’Ariccia (2001), and Marquez (2002) explore how 
information asymmetry between informed incumbents and uninformed entrants affects the 
structure of credit markets. Their key insight is that information asymmetries can inhibit lender 
entry, not simply because borrower types are unknown but also because incumbents’ 
proprietary information gives them an advantage: they have knowledge of previously rejected 
borrowers. This helps them determine whether credit applicants are new borrowers, unknown 
to all lenders, or bad borrowers that have been rejected by incumbents. Potential entrants, 
therefore, suffer an adverse selection problem, due to their inability to distinguish between the 
new borrowers and the previously rejected ones. This adverse selection is greater in markets 
where proprietary information is concentrated among fewer incumbents, because each 
incumbent has a higher probability of identifying bad borrowers. It is also greater when entrants 
lack specific expertise in evaluating credit risks and when the ratio of new to bad borrowers is 
low, either because there is low borrower turnover or a greater prevalence of bad borrowers.  
Marquez (2002) examines how information asymmetry affects competition for 
borrowers among incumbents that each have proprietary information on a different subset of 
borrowers. In markets where there are many incumbents and proprietary information is 
dispersed, each incumbent is less likely to have an information advantage. In contrast, markets 
with proprietary information concentrated among fewer incumbents should exhibit more severe 
adverse selection problems, less competition between incumbents, and more opportunities to 
collect informational rents. Thus, lenders should have weaker incentives to share information 
when proprietary information is concentrated among fewer competitors in their home markets. 
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) show that lenders’ incentives to share information in a 
formal mechanism are greater when adverse selection problems are worse. In particular, they 
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focus on when lenders collectively choose to share with each other. Despite the differences 
between their theory and our setting, where lenders individually choose to share information, 
the key insights from their theory help us understand the trade-offs that influence when lenders 
share information. 
Although information sharing helps lenders overcome the adverse selection problem 
associated with new market entry, information sharing can intensify competition, and therefore 
lenders may not necessarily agree to share (Vives, 1990; and Padilla and Pagano, 1997). 
Therefore, lenders face a trade-off: they may participate, despite the loss of potential rents, if 
doing so sufficiently reduces adverse selection problems and if borrowers increase their efforts 
to avoid defaulting and being labeled bad credit risks (Padilla and Pagano 2000). 
It follows that lenders should choose to share information sooner when information 
asymmetry problems are smaller in their home markets, where protection from competition 
from both incumbents and entrants is lower ex-ante, and when information asymmetry 
problems are larger in potential markets, where the barriers to entry are highest ex-ante. We 
thus expect that bureau entry will happen earlier for lenders in dispersed home markets and 
earlier for potential entrants facing new markets with concentrated lender bases. In addition, it 
follows that lenders should join sooner when there are higher levels of delinquencies in 
potential markets because a higher prevalence of bad types increases adverse selection 
problems. 
A potential objection to this descriptive theory of entry timing is that, although 
members join to overcome entry barriers in concentrated markets, the lenders in these markets 
have little incentive to share information. However, as long as a lender is not competing solely 
in concentrated markets, then the trade-off between gaining access to new markets and 
protecting informational rents in existing markets matters for entry timing. In addition, even if 
a lender has little incentive to share information, the bureau affects the status quo such that the 
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lender may not be able to protect her rents in a concentrated market if she does not join the 
bureau when other lenders do.  
Once lenders join, the same adverse selection problems should influence lending 
patterns. First, we expect new lending to be focused in new markets, especially those with 
proprietary information concentrated among fewer lenders, where adverse selection problems 
are greatest ex-ante. 
Second, as information sharing becomes more pervasive, competition for borrowers 
will increase (Vives 1990; Padilla and Pagano 1997). One way that lenders can protect 
themselves is to invest in expertise that differentiates them from rivals (Boot and Thakor 2000). 
Hauswald and Marquez (2006) show that, as entry costs decline and more lenders enter a 
market, lenders invest less in transferable expertise, more in sector-specific expertise, and focus 
on core markets. This focus on core markets helps lenders develop a comparative advantage in 
screening and monitoring (Winton 1999; Acharya et al. 2006; Paravisini et al. 2015) and earn 
rents (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992). In our secured commercial credit setting, collateral is an 
important dimension of expertise. Therefore we expect lenders to leverage their collateral 
expertise when entering new collateral markets by targeting collateral types that share 
screening and monitoring technologies with the lender’s existing collateral exposures.  
 
3. Institutional Setting  
3.1 The PayNet Credit Bureau 
The PayNet equipment finance bureau launched in 2001.5 Since then, over 200 lenders 
have joined, including eight of the 10 largest lenders in the segment as well as a number of 
                                                 
5 Sutherland (2018) uses the launch of PayNet to show information sharing reduces switching costs for small 
borrowers and compels lenders to be more transactional in their interactions with borrowers. Doblas-Madrid and 
Minetti (2013) use an earlier version of the PayNet database to investigate the impact of lender information sharing 
on firms’ payment performance. Their results reveal that information sharing reduces contract delinquencies and 
defaults, particularly for informationally opaque firms.  
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smaller captives and regional banks. As of August 2018, the PayNet database contained over 
$1.6 trillion of obligations from 24 million contracts.  
PayNet was founded to fill a gap in the U.S. small business lending market: while 
delinquency and contract information has been voluntarily shared among consumer lenders for 
decades, until 2001 commercial lenders in the U.S. equipment finance market regularly 
originated loans without knowing how the borrower had previously serviced similar liabilities 
(Ware 2002). Repositories such as Dun & Bradstreet and Experian had limited coverage of the 
market and therefore lacked timely, detailed information about firms’ outstanding liabilities or 
the length and quality of their payment history.  
PayNet credit reports offer three innovations over competitors’ products and the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) public collateral filings. First, reports contain a detailed 
payment history of the borrower, including historical credit payments and delinquency status. 
Second, PayNet provides contract-level detail of all equipment term loans and leases. This was 
an important feature because, before PayNet, lenders could only observe payment records for 
much smaller non-loan obligations (e.g., utility bills) for most borrowers (Ware 2002). Third, 
members can query, for a fee, PayNet’s credit file, proprietary credit score, and probability of 
default for each borrower.6 
Like other voluntary credit bureaus, PayNet operates on the principle of reciprocity. 
Lenders may participate only if they agree to share all past, present, and future credit files with 
other members. PayNet does not sell or otherwise make bureau information available to 
nonmembers. As members of the bureau, lenders must purchase individual credit files for 
applicants or existing clients. PayNet’s interface does not allow them to perform bulk 
                                                 
6 Proprietary credit scores and default probabilities are estimated using all ongoing and past contract information 
for each borrower across all contracts in the bureau. 
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downloads of credit files or data mine (e.g., by industry, location, or collateral type).7 Lender 
identities are anonymous in the bureau.8  
Several features of PayNet and the U.S. equipment finance market serve to ensure the 
accuracy of shared information. First, to become members, lenders must invest significantly in 
technology to allow PayNet to pull information directly from their internal systems. Second, 
lenders are subject to PayNet’s initial testing and ongoing audits to verify that shared 
information is complete and accurate. Additionally, PayNet cross-checks data against several 
sources, including the information shared by other lenders with similar exposures, the lender’s 
prior information, trade and macroeconomic data, and public filings including UCC public 
collateral filings.9  Finally, PayNet punishes misreporting with exclusion from the bureau. 
Misreporting also exposes lenders to litigation from borrowers and other bureau members.10  
3.2 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
We construct our dataset from a panel of 20,000 randomly chosen borrowers’ credit 
files, detailing payment histories and terms for over 400,000 contracts between 1998 and 2014. 
For each sample firm, we observe every contract with lenders that have joined PayNet, 
including those beginning and maturing before the lender joins.11 For each contract, we observe 
the amount, collateral type, maturity, payment frequency, guarantor requirement, and payment 
history as well as the state, industry, and age of the firm.12  
PayNet classifies contracts as one of 23 collateral types. Agricultural equipment, 
construction equipment, computers, copiers and fax machines, and trucks are the most 
                                                 
7 For similar reasons, lenders cannot join, download all credit files, and then quit.  
8 The appendix of Sutherland (2018) contains additional detail about PayNet and the equipment finance market. 
9 In the United States, lenders make UCC financing statement filings to establish their legal right to collateral if a 
borrower defaults. Because these filings are public and Secretaries of State maintain searchable online records 
dating back to the 1990s or earlier, PayNet can verify that a lender has shared a given contract.  
10 Together, these features help prevent lender manipulation of shared information to protect informational rents, 
as documented in a mandatory information sharing setting by Giannetti et al. (2017). 
11 Naturally, we cannot observe the contracts of lenders that never share information with PayNet. Note, however, 
that they comprise a limited share of the market, given the high degree of market concentration and PayNet’s 
inclusion of eight of the 10 largest lenders as members. 
12 We cannot observe the interest rate charged for contracts and therefore cannot construct profitability measures.  
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commonly observed collateral types in our sample. Collateral types vary in terms of the 
number of lenders with exposure. For example, Table A1 of the online appendix shows that 
approximately half of our sample lenders contract in computers; by comparison, only nine 
offer contracts for boats.  
Table 1 summarizes the contract features and exposures for lenders in the quarter before 
they join PayNet. The typical contract size for the average (median) lender is $190,692 
($76,308). Next, we measure each lender’s exposure in terms of their number of outstanding 
contracts, collateral types, and collateral type-regions. The average (median) lender has 481.9 
(32.0) contracts with the borrowers in our sample. Of the 23 collateral type categories in 
PayNet, the average (median) lender is involved in 5.2 (3.0) before joining. Our tests aggregate 
states into one of nine census regions.13 Collateral offerings typically span multiple regions, as 
the average (median) lender has 18.7 (8.0) collateral type-region exposures. Seventy-five 
percent of the typical lender’s contracts are leases. 
 
4. Voluntary Information Sharing and Credit Bureau Entry 
In this section, we use our theoretical framework to model how the costs and benefits 
of information sharing influence the timing of lender bureau entry. To capture these costs and 
benefits, we measure the concentration of credit in the markets the lender competes in (Home 
Market HHI) and the markets where the lender has no exposure (New Market HHI). We 
measure each lender’s market concentration as follows. First, we measure the market 
concentration in each collateral type-region as the credit-weighted HHI that quarter.14 Second, 
we estimate a lender’s home market concentration as the equal-weighted collateral type-region 
                                                 
13 The regions include the Northeast, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, 
East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific Divisions. See 
http://www2.census.gov/geo/docs/maps-data/maps/reg_div.txt for state-to-region mappings. 
14 That is, we sum the squared market shares for lenders in the collateral type-region that quarter, where market 
shares are based on total credit for the collateral type-region.  
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HHI, based on the collateral type-regions the lender has exposure to when it first appears in the 
data, that is, before entering the bureau. Third, we estimate a lender’s new market concentration 
as the equal-weighted collateral type-region HHI, based on the collateral type-regions the 
lender does not have exposure to when it first appears in the data.15  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on market concentration. The average home 
(new) market HHI measured at PayNet’s launch is 0.24 (0.30). Consistent with our assumption 
that the HHI captures the information structure of credit markets and that higher HHI reflects 
greater adverse selection, we find the relationship-switching rate in high HHI markets prior to 
PayNet is 2.0%, statistically and economically lower than the 2.9% rate in low HHI markets.16  
For each lender’s home and new markets, we also measure the average delinquency 
rate as a proxy for credit risk and the average growth in aggregate credit. For the typical lender, 
the average delinquency rate across contracts in home (new) markets is 17% (16%). Growth in 
home (new) markets before entry averages 6% (2%). 
We begin our analysis by examining how each lender’s entry year varies by its home 
and new market concentrations. Figure 1 plots the pre-PayNet market concentrations for 
lenders (right-hand side y-axis) against the entry-year as well as the fraction of lenders entering 
in each year (left-hand side y-axis) from the launch of the bureau in 2001 to 2014, the end of 
our sample. For this figure, we measure market concentrations for each lender pre-PayNet, in 
early 2001, to capture the degree to which concentration in the absence of information sharing 
affects incentives to start sharing. 
The figure shows that early entrants face low home market concentration and high new 
market concentration. These early entrants likely face stiff competition in their existing markets 
                                                 
15 Alternatively, one could apply value-weighted HHIs. Unfortunately, no such weights exist for new markets, in 
which the lender has no exposure by design. Hence, we apply the same methodology of using equal weights for 
both home and new HHI. In unreported results, we confirm that results are similar if we use a value-weighted 
home HHI.  
16 Switching rates are defined as the average probability that a borrower stops contracting with a lender this quarter 
after contracting with them last quarter. 
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but information asymmetry problems in accessing new markets, which implies they are the 
lenders with the most to gain from sharing information. This pattern is consistent with our 
theoretical discussion in Section 2. As the bureau grows, lenders with initial higher home 
market concentration and lower new market concentration join. In addition, the staggered 
timing of lender entry presented in Figure 1 indicates that bureau entry was unlikely due to a 
single credit event, business cycles, or growth in the equipment lending market.  
To formalize the evidence from Figure 1, we estimate a model of lender entry. The 
dependent variable is Time to Entry, which measures the number of years from the current year 
until the year the lender enters the bureau. To illustrate, for a lender entering in 2005, Time to 
Entry equals two in 2003, one in 2004, zero in 2005, and is not recorded thereafter. We examine 
lenders in “event time” in this manner because it allows us to analyze how the post-PayNet 
variation in market, lender, and bureau characteristics explains entry. In particular, our tests 
allow us to estimate how the time to entry for each nonmember is affected by market 
concentrations, where concentrations are updated each year to account for how sharing by 
members impacts competition. In addition, tracking the Time to Entry for each lender allows 
us to include calendar year fixed effects to absorb common factors within each year, such as 
credit events or business cycles, that might explain entry.17 Standard errors are clustered at the 
lender level. We track our 207 sample lenders in each year from 1999 up to and including entry 
(years after entry are omitted), giving us 2,114 lender-year observations.  
We model Time to Entry as a function of market, lender, and bureau characteristics.18   
For home and new market characteristics, we measure the HHI, average delinquency rate 
across contracts, and aggregate market growth rate. For lender characteristics, we study the 
                                                 
17 An alternative approach would be to include a single observation per lender, with the dependent variable being 
the years to entry from the start of our sample and all independent variables measured pre-PayNet. However, this 
would introduce measurement error by ignoring the effects of PayNet participation on market concentration and 
our other variables. 
18 To facilitate interpretation, we estimate the model using an OLS specification. Results are similar using a 
proportional hazard model.  
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degree of specialization in collateral types (Log Collateral Types), lender size (Log Credit), 
mix of lease and loan contracts (Lease Share), and geographic scope (Log Regions) during the 
year. Last, to model coordination among lenders, we develop a lender-specific measure of the 
number of bureau members with exposures in the lender’s home markets (Log Member Count).  
In column 1 of Table 2, we include only the home and new market concentrations of 
each lender. In line with the unconditional analysis presented in Figure 1, the conditional results 
show that lenders with highly concentrated home markets, where the costs to sharing 
information are arguably higher, enter later (the coefficient on Home Market HHI is positive 
and significant). Those facing highly concentrated new markets, where the benefits of 
accessing shared information are arguably higher, enter earlier (New Market HHI is 
significantly negative).  
Next, in columns 2 and 3, we examine how delinquencies and credit growth in the two 
kinds of markets affect entry. We find that lenders join earlier when new markets have higher 
delinquency rates, consistent with entrants facing greater adverse selection, due to incumbents’ 
proprietary information on “bad” borrowers. Similarly, entry is delayed for lenders with higher 
growth in new markets, where entrants face lower adverse selection. In other words, lenders 
join sooner when adverse selection problems are most severe. Together, the results in columns 
1–3 imply that lenders share information when the benefits of reducing adverse selection in 
new markets are greater than the costs of increased competition in their existing markets.19  
In column 4, we introduce lender characteristics, measured as the average during the 
year for each lender. The results on home and new market concentration continue to hold. The 
coefficients of 1.613 and -36.108 on Home Market HHI and New Market HHI, respectively, 
                                                 
19 An alternate hypothesis is that lenders in concentrated home markets should enter sooner because they can 
retain clients and protect rents, despite information sharing, while still gaining access to new markets. Then, one 
should expect a negative coefficient on both Home Market HHI, counter to our results. Thus it is unlikely that our 
results are driven by lenders joining earlier when they can protect rents in concentrated markets. Reinforcing this 
point, Sutherland (2018) finds that borrower switching rates increase significantly with information sharing, 
implying that client retention is not assured post information sharing.  
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imply that a one standard deviation increase in Home (New) Market HHI delays (accelerates) 
entry by 0.2 (1.5) years. Furthermore, those entering earlier tend to be larger, lend against 
multiple collateral types, and contract more using leasing. Combined with our findings on home 
market concentration, this evidence is consistent with lenders entering earlier when they have 
less private information to protect. By comparison, lenders with monitoring technology that 
relies upon private information, such as specialist lenders that focus in fewer collateral markets 
and lenders contracting less using leasing, join later.  
Heterogeneity in market and lender characteristics alone may not explain entry 
decisions. Decisions may also be linked to the depth of bureau coverage if lenders fear that 
coverage can result in market segmentation. Similarly, the decision to join may be correlated 
with the breadth of lenders in the bureau if, as the bureau succeeds, membership improves the 
reputation of lenders.  
These mechanisms imply that lender entry should be positively correlated with the 
breadth of the bureau, because the costs of not being a bureau member increase as competitors 
join. In column 5 of Table 2, we examine this by including a lender-specific measure of the 
number of bureau members that year. Our measure considers only the number of members in 
the lender’s home market and takes the average if the lender has than one home market. The 
results show that lenders are more likely to enter sooner as bureau membership increases, 
consistent with lenders responding to each other’s actions. Our finding that entry is explained 
by concentration in existing and new markets continues to hold.  
We conduct a series of robustness tests in Table A2 of the online appendix to reinforce 
our findings. First, we drop lenders joining before 2004 to examine whether the entry dynamics 
we document endure beyond the first movers to join PayNet. Column 1 shows that our 
inferences are similar. Second, we conduct a placebo analysis where we counterfactually assign 
random entry years to lenders and report average coefficients from 1,000 trials in column 2. 
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We find that none of our coefficients are significant. Third, we employ alternative 
classifications of home and new markets, by assessing lender exposures as of the second quarter 
of 2001 (the quarter before the bureau launched). Column 3 shows that our results hold.20 
In summary, we provide evidence that, when deciding to share information, lenders 
trade-off a reduction in adverse selection in potential markets against heightened competition 
in existing ones.  
 
5. Information Sharing Effects on Lending 
5.1 Descriptive Evidence on Lender Exposure Dynamics 
We build upon our bureau entry analysis by studying lenders’ portfolios after sharing 
information. First, using a simple event study, we examine how the lenders’ portfolios change 
after information is shared by tracking each lender before and after they join. The goal of this 
analysis is to offer descriptive evidence on whether lenders increase credit and enter new 
markets post information sharing. Of course, these results will reflect both the decision to share 
information and the effects of information sharing, but they are useful to gauge the overall 
changes in lending.  
We construct a lender-quarter panel where the event time t = 0 is measured as the last 
day of the quarter before the quarter in which each lender joins the bureau. The event window 
includes four quarters before and four quarters after the entry. This narrow window helps 
isolate the effects of information sharing from market-wide and lender-specific developments 
unrelated to information sharing.  
We estimate: 
                                                 
20 Finally, we address the concern that entry is clustered by region or collateral type, say, because of region or 
collateral type-specific growth. First, although our tests control for growth in the lender’s home and new markets, 
we study the mean entry time by lenders in each region and collateral type and find no obvious pattern. Second, 
we repeat our tests with fixed effects for the collateral type and region in which the lender has the most exposure 
and find our results hold. 
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, (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the log exposure measure for lender i at event time t, measured in quarters around 
bureau entry. For each lender-quarter, exposure measures comprise the dollar amount of credit 
and number of collateral type-region markets in the portfolio. Member is a dummy variable 
equal to one for observations after the lender has joined the bureau. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼𝑡 are lender and 
time fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors by lender.  
We present the results from estimating (1) in Table 3. In column 1, we find that lenders 
significantly increase the amount of credit granted upon entering the bureau. Portfolio credit 
increases by 22.1% from the year before to the year after entry. Column 2 reveals lenders 
increase the number of markets (i.e., collateral type-region exposures) by 8.5%. Of course, 
this descriptive analysis is not designed to account for selection into voluntary sharing.  
5.2 Information Sharing and Lender Exposure Dynamics 
5.2.1 Empirical Specification 
Our exposure tests exploit variation in information coverage stemming from other 
members entering the bureau to examine how members expand credit in existing and new 
geographic markets within their specialization in collateral. We model lender exposures within 
collateral type-region as a function of the information coverage in the bureau, which a lender 
observes only after becoming a member. Specifically, we examine whether a member’s credit 
exposure to a collateral type-region responds to changes in the stock of information shared in 
the bureau for the same collateral type-region and compare this response with that of 
nonmembers, who should not be directly affected by the information shared in the bureau.21  
The empirical design mitigates concerns that voluntary entry by a lender is endogenous, 
by exploiting the staggered voluntary entry of other lenders to the bureau to provide exogenous 
                                                 
21 Studying credit exposure and coverage at the collateral type rather than collateral type-region level produces 
the same inferences.  
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variation in the information available to current members.22 This allows us to examine whether 
a lender’s change in exposure in a market follows from a specialization in a specific collateral 
type and a shock to bureau coverage for that market, and not to either the decision to enter the 
bureau or growth in the number of bureau contracts per se.  
The specification is: 
, (2) 
where the unit of observation is at the lender-collateral type-region-quarter level. Because we 
focus on the degree to which information sharing results in expansion within a lender’s 
specialization, we condition on the collateral types each lender was exposed to when first 
appearing in the data.23 𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑟,𝑡 is the log dollar amount of credit that lender i has in collateral 
type j in region r in quarter t. 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 are lender-collateral fixed effects, which allow us to estimate 
exposure changes within a lender-collateral type offering. 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 are lender-quarter fixed effects, 
which absorb a lender’s average growth in lending across all markets each quarter, including 
the average effect of a lender’s decision to participate in the bureau as well as lender-level 
supply shocks affecting performance, capitalization, or the management team. 𝛼𝑗,𝑟,𝑡  are 
collateral type-region-quarter fixed effects, which account for demand shocks occurring at the 
collateral type-region level. 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is defined above. 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑟,𝑡 is the log number of 
contracts recorded in the bureau for collateral type j in region r in quarter t, excluding a lender’s 
own contracts. 
                                                 
22 The voluntary information sharing setting with staggered entry is similar to a sequential game, whereby lenders 
may join anticipating strategic entry from competing lenders. However, the staggered entry provides plausibly 
exogenous variation because lenders remain anonymous in the bureau, and lenders do not know which competitors 
will enter or when they will enter when making their own entry decision. 
23 There are two further motivations for conditioning on the lender’s initial collateral exposures. First, including 
new collateral exposures, which by construction have zero initial credit, would bias our tests in favor of post-entry 
expansion. Second, defining our sample this way allows us to separately study expansion along intensive (Tables 
4–5) and extensive (Table 7) margins with respect to collateral.  
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To illustrate the variation in coverage that we shall exploit in specification (2), Figure 
2 plots the growth in bureau coverage for the five most common collateral types. Although the 
bureau naturally grows over time, we note these five types experience coverage shocks at 
different points—the across-type correlation is just 0.33. Together with lenders’ staggered 
entry presented in Figure 1, this evidence highlights the rich variation in coverage—both in the 
time series and the cross-section across collateral types—we exploit in our tests. 
Several aspects of our research design warrant emphasis. If a lender’s entry decision is 
correlated with its overall credit expansion, this would be estimated by the coefficient on 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡, which is absorbed by the lender-quarter fixed effects. Similarly, if bureau coverage 
is correlated with credit demand in a collateral type-region, this effect on lending would be 
estimated for both members and nonmembers by the coefficient on 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑟,𝑡, which is 
absorbed by the collateral type-region-quarter fixed effects. Thus, to the extent that lenders 
specializing in the same collateral type-region market face the same demand for credit, 
independent of their joining decision, the coefficient  identifies the effect of information 
sharing on a member’s credit exposure.  
Next, we focus on expansion into new collateral markets and examine whether 
collateral expertise can explain expansion into related collateral types. In other words, rather 
than focus on expansion along the intensive margin of collateral specialization as in (2), we 
examine the expansion along the extensive margin. Specifically, we model the exposure in a 
new collateral type as a function of how related a lender’s existing collateral specialization is 
to the new collateral type. We develop a pairwise relatedness index capturing how similar two 
collateral types are in terms of specialization and the technology involved with contracting in 
those collateral types. We detail the construction of our relatedness index in Appendix B. Our 
tests estimate a specification similar to (2): 
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where the unit of observation is at the lender-collateral type-quarter level. To focus on the 
extensive margin, we restrict the sample to collateral types that the lender was not exposed to 
when they first appear in the data. 𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the log dollar amount of credit that lender i has in 
collateral type j in quarter t. 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑗 captures the maximum relatedness between lender 
i’s home collateral types and new collateral type j. 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 and 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 are lender-collateral and lender-
quarter fixed effects, respectively. If information sharing enhances the lender’s ability to enter 
related markets when expanding their collateral offerings, we expect the coefficient  to be 
positive.  
5.2.2 Lender Exposures within Collateral Specialization and Shocks to Coverage 
 
Table 4 studies how lender exposures are affected by bureau membership and 
information coverage. As an initial step, we use a modified version of equation (2) that includes 
lender-collateral, lender-quarter, and region-collateral fixed effects. Including region-
collateral, instead of region-collateral-quarter fixed effects, controls for time-invariant market 
demand for credit but not demand shocks that might be correlated with coverage. Hence, we 
can estimate the individual effect of Coverage on credit exposure, which represents the effect 
of coverage on exposure for nonmembers. This falsification test provides support for 
interpreting Coverage as a shock to information sharing in our empirical methodology.  
In column 1, we find an insignificant coefficient on Coverage, suggesting that, for 
nonmembers, lending within a market is insensitive to the stock of bureau credit files for that 
market. We find a positive and significant coefficient on Member × Coverage (10.5%). Next, 
we estimate equation (2) by adding region-collateral-quarter fixed effects. In column 2, we 
show that our results are robust to this specification. Changes in bureau coverage for a given 
𝑦𝑖 ,𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 ,𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛾 ×𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ,𝑗 + 𝛿 × 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ×
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 ,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑗 ,𝑡 ,  (3) 
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collateral type-region lead to lender increases in exposure in that same collateral type-region.24 
Economically, a one standard deviation increase in Coverage within a collateral type-region 
results in a 7.4% increase in credit within that collateral type-region for members.25 
We then perform a series of robustness tests using the specification from column 2 of 
Table 4. The results are presented in Table A4 of the online appendix. First, to establish that 
our Table 4 results arise from information coverage in the lender’s collateral specialization, 
we conduct a placebo test. Rather than measure the stock of information as the log number of 
bureau contracts for a given collateral type, we use Coverage Placebo, equal to the log number 
of all bureau contracts excluding that collateral type. If the exposure changes we document in 
Table 4 arise spuriously and are unrelated to improved screening and monitoring using bureau 
files, then we should continue to find a significant coefficient on the interaction term. 
Likewise, if lenders can expand without collateral-specific information, then their exposures 
could respond to increases in coverage of other collateral markets. Column 1 shows no post-
membership credit expansion resulting from changes in Coverage Placebo. This reinforces 
that our findings are indeed driven by the availability of credit files for a given collateral type. 
Second, we modify our Coverage variable to include stale contracts, defined as only 
contracts that were open four quarters ago (Stale Coverage). Lenders may find stale contracts 
useful for informing expansion, albeit less useful than contracts open today. Column 2 shows 
that the coefficient on Member × Stale Coverage is approximately 27% weaker than the 
original interaction term from Table 4, column 2. This is consistent with the availability of 
timely exposure-specific coverage driving the expansion in our tests.  
                                                 
24 In Table A3 of the online appendix, we repeat our tests using alternative exposure measures: the number of 
contracts and number of states for the lender in the collateral type-region. Because census regions comprise six 
states on average, the number of state exposures within a region can change over time for individual lenders. We 
arrive at the same inferences using these measures.  
25 We multiply the 0.115 coefficient on Member x Coverage by the 0.64 standard deviation in Coverage, measured 
within collateral type-region. 
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Third, to ensure our results are not solely driven by the largest lenders, which comprise 
a disproportionate share of our lender-collateral type-region-quarter observations, we repeat 
our tests after omitting these lenders. Column 3 shows our results are the same when we 
exclude the five largest lenders by total credit—using other thresholds (e.g., 10 lenders) 
produces the same inference. Last, we consider whether our results are concentrated in the 
early years of the bureau. Parallel to our Table A2, column 1 tests, we separate early joiners 
(those sharing in 2003 or earlier) from those that join later. Columns 4 and 5 show comparable 
results across these groups.  
5.2.3 Lender Exposures and Barriers to Entry 
Having established the robustness of our results, we now perform cross-sectional tests 
according to whether the collateral type-region markets are new to the lender, and the degree 
of concentration in these markets. The hypothesis, based on our bureau entry analyses, is that 
the lending response to bureau information coverage should be strongest for new markets, and 
within these markets strongest for those with high concentration. 
Once again, we employ the specification presented in column 2 of Table 4, where we 
examine lending at the collateral type-region-quarter level and condition on expansion within 
collateral types that lenders contract in prior to joining the bureau. As in Table 2, home and 
new markets are classified according to whether the lender contracts in them (home) or not 
(new) prior to sharing. Finally, for each lender, we split its markets into four groups: home 
markets with low HHI, new markets with low HHI, home markets with high HHI, and new 
markets with high HHI.  
Table 5 presents the results. We find credit expansion using shared information is 
focused in new markets, especially those with high concentration. We find no statistical 
expansion related to information coverage in home markets. This complements our entry 
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analysis finding that lenders’ incentives to share information are positively related to New 
Market HHI.  
Overall, our results on lending dynamics present evidence that lenders offer more credit 
after joining the bureau. Information sharing and collateral specialization are central to this 
expansion. Bureau member exposures to a collateral type evolve with shocks to bureau 
coverage for that collateral type, while nonmembers experience no such change. Exposure 
growth is concentrated in a lender’s new markets, especially those where information sharing 
alleviates adverse selection problems.  
5.2.4 Lender Exposures in New Collateral Types and Shocks to Coverage 
Our tests so far study how lenders expand within their existing collateral markets upon 
entering the bureau. Next, we examine whether lenders enter new collateral markets, given 
their expertise and the bureau coverage for the new markets.  
One possible expansion strategy is for the lender to enter new collateral markets that 
share features with their existing ones. For example, computers and copiers likely involve a 
similar set of vendors, borrowers, and approaches to screening and monitoring. On the other 
hand, there is less overlap in lending technology between computers and logging or railroad 
equipment. Our hypothesis is that a lender first exposed to copiers, for example, is more likely 
to expand into computers than into railroad equipment after joining the bureau and that 
information coverage aids such expansion. 
To understand the degree to which lending technologies are common across collateral 
types, we develop an index of collateral type relatedness, following Teece et al. (1994) and 
Bryce and Winter (2009). For each pair of possible collateral types, we first count the number 
of lenders contracting in both. This count variable reveals the frequency with which collateral 
types overlap in lenders’ portfolios. Second, we adjust the count measure for the probability of 
overlap we would observe if collateral types were randomly allocated to lenders, given the 
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number of lenders and the observed quantities of each collateral type in the market. Third, we 
control for the dollar values of contracts to account for the fact that collateral types may not be 
related if, though observed together frequently, they comprise only a small fraction of a lender’s 
portfolio, on average. Fourth, we allow for indirect relatedness by translating relatedness to a 
distance and applying a shortest path algorithm. In other words, two collateral types, A and B, 
may be rarely observed together in a lender’s portfolio but each may be highly related to a third 
collateral type, C, which means that A and B are also related. Finally, we convert the distance 
measure back into a standardized relatedness measure by subtracting the mean and dividing by 
the standard deviation.26 Appendix B explains the construction of the index in detail. 
Our tests consider the maximum pairwise relatedness between the lender’s current 
collateral types and a given new collateral type for the lender. Appendix C presents summary 
statistics for our relatedness index. Although our tests use the standardized relatedness 
measure, we present percentiles in this appendix to facilitate interpretation.  
Our index produces pairwise similarity scores that capture underlying similarities in 
collateral features. For example, computers and copiers are scored as highly related (99.3), 
while railroads and copiers are not (15.9). Moreover, within a collateral type, our index scores 
high in comparable related assets (e.g., for computers, the highest relatedness scores are 
assigned to telecommunications, copier and fax, and office equipment). Table 6 summarizes 
the most related collateral type pairs in our sample.  
Table 7 presents the results on expansion into related collateral types using specification 
(3). Column 1 shows that, on average, lenders are more likely to expand in related new 
collateral types than unrelated ones. The positive and significant coefficient on Relatedness of 
0.912 implies that, unconditionally, credit increases by 91 percent more, on average, in new 
                                                 
26 We find similar results if we ignore contract amounts or do not allow for indirect relatedness when constructing 
the index. 
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related collateral types than new unrelated types, for a one standard deviation change in 
Relatedness across collateral types (given Relatedness is standardized and has a standard 
deviation of one). This relation strengthens after the lender enters the bureau. The positive 
coefficient on Member × Relatedness of 0.767, combined with the 0.912 coefficient on 
Relatedness, implies that for a one standard deviation increase in Relatedness, members 
increase credit by 168 percent more in a new related collateral type than a new unrelated type. 
Thus the results show that not only are lenders more likely to enter related than unrelated 
collateral markets at the extensive margin but that this preference strengthens, post information 
sharing, once lenders face lower adverse selection. 
In column 2, we add lender-collateral type fixed effects and obtain similar results. The 
effect on information sharing at the extensive margin is to increase new market entry into 
related collateral markets by 65 percent, relative to new market entry into unrelated collateral 
markets. Given our lender-collateral type and lender-quarter fixed effects, this stronger 
expansion into related collateral types cannot be explained by lender-level business model 
shifts or time-invariant features of individual lenders’ collateral offerings.  
Column 3 retains the same fixed effect structure as column 2 and introduces our 
Coverage variable to link collateral market expansion to bureau coverage.27 Interestingly, the 
coefficient on Member × Relatedness itself is no longer significant. Instead, expansion into 
related new collateral types in the post-period is primarily moderated by the availability of 
credit files in that collateral type. (Member × Relatedness × Coverage is positive and 
significant.) These results complement our earlier findings. Lenders’ collateral expertise 
influences their expansion into new collateral markets, and expansion efforts rely upon bureau 
coverage.  
                                                 
27 To ease interpretation, Coverage is expressed as a proportion (between 0 and 1) of the maximum all time 
coverage for each collateral type. Using the raw measure does not affect our inferences.  
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5.3 Information Sharing, Exposures, and Lending Technology 
The results on entry timing presented in Table 2 show that lending technology is key to 
understanding the decision to share information. In particular, lenders that rely more on private 
and soft information, are specialized, and operate in few markets face different costs and 
benefits from information sharing than their larger, less focused counterparts.  
Next, we study whether differences in lender size and focus affect the response to new 
information. On one hand, large lenders may not only be better able to exploit hard information 
shared in the bureau but also may want to access information on small borrowers from small 
lenders, since small lenders have an advantage in collecting private and soft information (Stein 
2002; Berger et al 2005; Liberti and Mian 2009; Loutskina and Strahan 2011). On the other 
hand, smaller and focused lenders may benefit from access to information on markets in which 
they have no presence or information collection technology. 
In Table 8, we examine how the information sharing effects on lender exposures vary 
by lender size and collateral focus. We employ specification (1), which examines differences 
in lenders’ overall exposures around bureau entry, because we want to capture the full effect 
of how information sharing affects a lender’s portfolio. The dependent variable is the log of 
dollar credit in the lender’s portfolio or the lender’s exposure to small clients in Panels A and 
B, respectively. Large Lender is an indicator variable equal to one for lenders with above-
median credit in the quarter before entry; #Collateral Types counts the log number of unique 
collateral types the lender contracts in before entry.  
The results in Column 1 of Panel A show that lenders, on average, increase credit after 
becoming members. Column 2 introduces an interaction between Member and Large Lender 
and finds that smaller lenders drive the credit expansion we document (though the 10.8% 
change in Log Credit for large lenders is statistically significant). Column 3 studies collateral 
focus and finds credit expansion is decreasing in the number of collateral exposures for the 
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lender (i.e., focused lenders expand credit more than diversified lenders). Column 4 includes 
interactions for both lender size and collateral focus and arrives at similar conclusions. Column 
5 saturates the regression with year × lender size and year × collateral focus categories (defined 
at the median). Doing so reduces concerns that our findings come from size or focus-specific 
trends being correlated with bureau entry. Our results are similar.  
In Panel B of Table 8, we study the share of the lender’s borrowers classified as small. 
We define Small Clients as a dummy variable equal to one for borrowers in the bottom quartile 
of total credit measured at the collateral type-quarter level. We then measure the percentage 
of the lender’s clients classified as small firms in each quarter. The results in column 1 show 
that, on average, small client exposure does not increase post joining the bureau. However, 
when we condition on lender size in column 2, the results reveal that larger lenders increase 
exposure to small borrowers by 2.5% more than smaller lenders. This is economically 
significant, when compared with the average pre-entry allocation of 19.1% to small firms by 
large lenders. By contrast, we find no relation between small client exposure, bureau 
membership, and lender collateral focus. 
Overall, these results indicate that conditional on joining, small lenders have the most 
to gain in terms of lending growth and that although large lenders see modest growth in their 
portfolio, they benefit by contracting more with small borrowers. Combined with the results 
in Table 2, where we show that small specialized lenders enter later, these results imply that 
small specialized lenders face both larger costs and benefits to sharing than other lenders and 
hence once they overcome the costs of sharing, they benefit more.  
Finally, the results also imply that information sharing increases competition for 
financing small borrowers, which arguably face the greatest barriers to accessing credit in the 
absence of information sharing.  
5.4 Information Sharing and Borrowers’ Credit Relationships 
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Our final set of tests examines contracting from the borrower perspective. We study 
how the number of lending relationships and credit outstanding for each borrower changes 
after they first have a credit file in PayNet (Post File). Two features of our tests provide for 
reliable estimates of the effect of information sharing on borrowers’ activities. First, lenders, 
not borrowers, decide to enter the bureau, so entry is exogenous to the borrower. Second, the 
micro unit of analysis allows us to control for industry-quarter fixed effects to account for 
contemporaneous changes in demand for credit within a sector, and borrower fixed effects to 
account for time-invariant firm characteristics.28  
Column 1 of Table 9 shows that the number of lending relationships for the average 
borrower increases by 6.0% in the post period. Economically, there is a one-sixth reduction in 
the share of borrowers with just one lending relationship. Next, we examine the effect on total 
borrowing. Column 2 shows a statistically and economically significant increase in total credit 
of 11.8%. Our results build upon the survey evidence documenting improved access to finance 
following the introduction or reform of credit bureaus in developing countries (Brown et al. 
2009; Love et al. 2013; Peria and Singh 2014).  
Finally, we examine whether the timing of credit access changes with file availability. 
To do this, we create an indicator variable measuring when firms are borrowing. This variable 
is equal to one if the firm started a new lending relationship without having an old contract 
maturing that quarter or a surrounding quarter. The intuition for this “off cycle” variable is 
that not being tied to the maturity cycle of current contracts provides financial flexibility for 
the borrowers. Column 3 shows that access to finance significantly improves once credit files 
are available. The likelihood of starting a new relationship off cycle increases by 0.7%, 
representing 5% of the pre-period mean.  
                                                 
28 We control for industry, rather than collateral type, effects here because many borrowers have more than one 
collateral type. 
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Overall, our results show that information sharing improves access to specialized 
lenders, suggesting that voluntary sharing also enhances a borrower’s access to credit. Thus, 
our findings contribute to a growing literature exploring the impact of credit scores and 
information sharing on credit markets.29 In addition, our results help rule out an alternate 
motivation for information sharing: collusion among lenders to protect their own rents.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We provide evidence that developments in technology that facilitate information 
sharing can change the competitive landscape of lending. We offer the first direct evidence on 
the trade-offs behind voluntary information sharing and how lenders share information to 
overcome adverse selection problems in new markets.  
Our findings help illuminate voluntary information sharing in financial markets and 
explain why intermediaries regularly forego rents when sharing. Our results highlight that, 
while adverse selection protects incumbents, lenders willingly share information to overcome 
information asymmetries impeding access to new markets. 
Rather than diversify, we find that lenders expand within their collateral expertise, 
suggesting that information sharing also provides better access to borrowers by specialized 
lenders. In addition, technology that allows for the transfer of private information or hardening 
of soft information, reduces the need of lenders to collect this information and potentially 
reduces hold-up problems associated with SME financing.  
Our study is also important for understanding the role of fintech in credit markets. Early 
literature mostly focused on fintech as an incubator for new lenders and how these new lenders 
compare with traditional lenders, especially in terms of efficiency (Philippon 2015) or 
                                                 
29 See, among others, Padilla and Pagano (2000), Jappelli and Pagano (2002), Musto (2004), Brown et al. (2009),  
Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013), Gonzales-Uribe and Osorio (2014), Bennardo et al. (2015), Paravisini and 
Schoar 2015, Balakrishnan and Ertan (2017), Giannetti et al. (2017), Liberti et al. (2017), and Sutherland (2018). 
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regulation (Philippon 2016; Buchak et. al. 2017). We show that fintech can also affect 
competition, lender business models, and access to credit in traditional credit markets. These 
results are particularly relevant in light of the recent expansion of digital platforms in credit 
markets. For example, in early 2018, the European Commission unveiled a FinTech Action 
Plan as part of their efforts to build a Capital Markets Union. The Action Plan addresses 19 
steps that focus on, among other initiatives, the digitization and sharing of credit information.  
Finally, our results raise the possibility that some credit markets may not be 
appropriately served by lenders, absent sharing mechanisms. While voluntary information 
sharing arises endogenously in the market we study, sharing may not arise where costs to 
individual lenders outweigh the benefits of a reduction in adverse selection. Studying not only 
the market structure, as we do, but also how information is used in screening and monitoring 
will help illuminate the relative benefits of information sharing (Strahan 2017). We leave this 
for future research. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Time to Entry The number of years from the current year, starting in 1999, until 
the year of bureau entry for the lender. The variable is recorded 
as missing thereafter. 
Market A lending segment defined as the intersection of one of 23 
collateral types and one of nine U.S. census regions. 
Home Market Those collateral type-regions the lender competed in during its 
first quarter in the data. 
New Market Those collateral type-regions the lender did not compete in 
during its first quarter in the data. 
Home Market HHI The Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the lender’s home markets. 
The index is measured each year at the collateral type-region 
level. If the lender competes in more than one market, we equal-
weight the HHIs to arrive at Home Market HHI.  
New Market HHI The Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the lender’s new markets. 
The index is measured each year at the collateral type-region 
level. We equal-weight the HHIs to arrive at New Market HHI. 
Home Market Growth The change in total credit across all lenders in the lender’s home 
markets from last year to this year. We equal-weight the growth 
rates across markets to arrive at Home Market Growth. 
New Market Growth The change in total credit across all lenders in the lender’s new 
markets from last year to this year. We equal-weight the growth 
rates across markets to arrive at New Market Growth. 
Home Market 
Delinquency 
The proportion of all contracts in the lender’s home markets that 
are currently delinquent. 
New Market 
Delinquency 
The proportion of all contracts in the lender’s new markets that 
are currently delinquent. 
Log Markets The log number of markets (collateral type-region pairs) the 
lender contracts in.  
Log Regions The log number of census regions the lender contracts in. 
Log Collateral Types The log number of collateral types the lender contracts in.  
Log Credit The log dollar value of all open contracts for the lender. For 
leases, we sum the total required payments during the term of 
the contract. 
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Lease Share The percentage of the lender’s contracts that are leases.  
Log Member Count A lender-year measure of the number of current members of the 
bureau. Each year, we count the number of members in each 
market. Then, for each lender-year, we take the average number 
of members across the lender’s home markets. 
Member An indicator variable equal to one for all of the quarters after the 
lender has joined the bureau and zero otherwise. 
Coverage The log number of open (i.e., pre-maturity) contracts contained 
in the bureau for a given collateral type or collateral type-region. 
Relatedness A measure of the degree of similarity between two collateral 
types. In our tests, we measure the maximum relatedness 
between a new collateral type and the lender’s existing collateral 
offerings. Appendix B describes the construction of the 
relatedness measure. 
Large Lender An indicator variable equal to one for lenders with above median 
credit in the quarter before entering the bureau and zero 
otherwise. 
% Portfolio Small 
Clients 
The percentage of the lender’s clients in the smallest quartile of 
total credit within the collateral type-quarter.  
Log # Lending 
Relationships 
The log number of lenders currently providing the borrower with 
credit.  
Log Borrower Credit The log total value of all open contracts for the borrower.  
Starts New Relationship 
Off Cycle 
An indicator variable equal to one for borrowers that started a 
new lending relationship in a quarter without having another 
contract maturing that quarter or a surrounding quarter (i.e., t – 
1, t, or t + 1) and zero otherwise. 
Post File An indicator variable equal to one for the period after the 
borrower first appears in the bureau and zero otherwise.  
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Appendix B: Construction of the Collateral Type Relatedness Index 
 
The construction of the collateral type relatedness index is motivated by Teece et al. (1994) 
and Bryce and Winter (2009) and involves the following steps. 
 
Step 1: Estimating the collateral type dyad count. We begin by observing how many times two 
collateral types (a collateral type dyad) are observed together in the same lender. 
 
We start with 𝐾 = 207 lenders contracting in 𝐼 = 23 collateral types. Let 𝐶𝑖𝑘 = 1 if lender 𝑘 
contracts in collateral type i and 0 otherwise. The number of lenders active in collateral type i 
is 𝑛𝑖 = ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑘
𝑘=207
𝑘=1 , and the number of lenders active in both collateral type i and collateral type 
j is 𝐽𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑘𝐶𝑗𝑘
𝑘=207
𝑘=1 . 
 
Step 2: Estimating the collateral type dyad relatedness. Next, we scale the collateral dyad count 
to control for the observed frequency of each collateral type. Specifically, Jij cannot be taken 
directly as a measure of relatedness and must be adjusted for the number of lenders appearing 
in the dyad if lenders were randomly assigned to collateral types. 
 
To measure the distribution of the collateral dyad, 𝑋𝑖𝑘 consider the probability that x out of 𝐾 
lenders receive a random assignment to both collateral types i and j. For this random model, 
we take the collateral type sizes 𝑛𝑖 and 𝑛𝑗 and the population size 𝐾 as given and ask how many 
times do the 𝑛𝑗 j’s overlap with the 𝑛𝑖 i’s consistent with the observed 𝑥.   
 
i. Start with the 𝑛𝑗 lenders in collateral type j. 
ii. From these nj lenders, allocate the 𝑥 lenders in the overlap with collateral type i to 
𝑥 of the 𝑛𝑖 observations. This can happen in (
𝑛𝑖
𝑥
)ways. 
iii. Allocate the remaining 𝑛𝑗 − 𝑥 lenders that are in collateral type j to the 𝐾 − 𝑛𝑖 
lenders not in the overlap. This can happen in (𝐾−𝑛𝑖
𝑛𝑗−𝑥
) ways. 
iv. Normalize the sorts in (ii) and (iii) by the total number of ways the 𝑛𝑗 lenders can 
be sorted, i.e., the number of ways one can choose 𝑛𝑗 lenders from 𝐾 lenders, (
𝐾
𝑛𝑗
). 
 
Then the probability of observing an overlap of x is given by the hypergeometric random 
variable: 
 
   𝑃[𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥] =
(𝑛𝑖𝑥 )(
𝐾−𝑛𝑖
𝑛𝑗−𝑥
)
( 𝐾𝑛𝑗
)
,     (1) 
 
with a mean of: 
 
,      (2) 
 
and variance of: 
 
 
 
.     (3) 
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We can now compare the observed dyad 𝐽𝑖𝑗 with the expected dyad, 𝐸[𝑋𝑖𝑗], by estimating the 
standardized dyad:  
 
.      (4) 
 
When the 𝜏𝑖𝑗 is positive and large, it indicates systematic exposure by lenders into pairs of 
collateral types. That is, types are related if lenders finance collateral types that share similar 
monitoring technologies. 
 
Step 3: Estimating the weighted collateral type dyad relatedness. A shortfall of the 
standardized measure estimated in step 2 is that it does not reflect the economic importance of 
the dyad frequency of collateral types within a lender. For example, two activities each 
contributing only 1%–2% of the lenders’ contract pool may be only weakly related, whereas 
two collateral types that each secure close to half of the contract pool are likely related more 
strongly. If the pattern is consistent across all lenders operating in two collateral types, then 
this should be reflected in the relatedness score of the dyad.  
 
We account for the dyad weights as follows. The weight is determined by comparing for each 
dyad the relative weights, 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗, of total contract pool that are attributable to each activity i 
and j of the dyad. The minimum of these two weights, 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗], is then selected for each 
lender and averaged across all lenders operating in the dyad. The minimum weight is selected 
because it represents an “upper bound” measure of how closely related the two industries could 
be when they appear together. If collateral type A, having a weight of 0.01, is combined with 
collateral type B, having a weight of 0.70, the 0.01 is selected to provide information on the 
importance of the dyad to that lender. These minimum weights are then averaged across all 
lenders operating in the dyad to create the dyad weight.  
 
The average weight 𝑆𝑖𝑗produced by all lenders operating in the dyad is 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑘[𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑗]𝐶𝑖𝑘𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑘
∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑘𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑘
.     (5) 
 
To adjust the standardized measures by the weight, the scores in (4) are first converted to a 
distance matrix such that all measures are positive and a smaller measure reflects high 
relatedness. The distance matrix is computed by identifying the maximum 𝜏𝑖𝑗among the set of 
normalized scores and subtracting all scores from this value.  
 
Following this transformation, cell values in the distance matrix are divided by (5), such that 
those dyads with a small weighting are transformed to be “more” distant. The resulting matrix 
can be evaluated as a network in which the values in matrix cells are the distances between 
nodes i and j. The network is comprised of collateral type vertices connected by arcs having 
weight (length) inversely proportional to relatedness.  
 
Step 4: Estimating relatedness using shortest paths 
The weighted distance measure in step 3 allows only for direct relatedness and not indirect 
relatedness. For example, consider that collateral types x and y have distance “2” and y and z 
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have distance “3,” and the distance for x and z is unobserved. To account for this, we employ 
a shortest path measure, which implies that x and z must have a distance of 5.  
 
The shortest path method produces a distance measure for dyads that are not directly connected 
in the network, and it substitutes a shortest path distance for a direct link between two collateral 
types when the path distance is shorter than the direct distance.  
 
To complete construction of the index, the weighted distance matrix, which is now filled with 
shortest path scores, is converted to a similarities matrix, where the greatest values, rather than 
the lowest values, represent the highest relatedness. This is done simply by subtracting each 
computed path length score from the maximum computed path length, which implicitly sets 
the least related dyad to a value of zero and the most related dyad to some positive value. 
Following the similarities transformation, index scores are transformed to have a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1. Specifically, the similarity score is standardized by subtracting 
the mean of the distribution from each value and dividing by the standard deviation.  
 
Plots of the distribution of all normalized (not percentile) dyad relatedness index scores are 
presented in Appendix C. 
42 
 
Appendix C: Collateral Type Relatedness Index 
 
The table presents relatedness scores for collateral type pairs from the 207 lenders observed in the sample. Relatedness scores are distributed 
approximately normally. Normalized values, or z-scores, range from a low of -2.45 to a high of 2.64 standard deviations from the mean. To 
facilitate interpretation, the relatedness scores have been transformed into a percentile that represents the cumulative area under the distribution 
and ranges between 0 and 100. An index score of 70 implies that 70% of collateral type dyads are less related than the focal score, whereas 30% 
are more related. 
 
 
2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 19) 20) 21) 22) 23)
1) Agricultural 18.5 40.2 4.0 50.0 90.2 81.5 80.8 50.7 87.0 79.3 86.6 76.1 74.3 77.9 54.7 14.9 92.0 75.4 81.2 87.3 60.1 43.1
2) Aircraft 10.9 64.9 16.7 25.0 35.1 33.7 8.0 17.8 9.8 17.0 30.4 21.7 31.9 19.2 35.5 11.6 30.1 34.1 42.8 17.4 14.1
3) Automobiles 1.1 51.4 68.8 59.8 60.5 7.2 56.2 19.9 68.1 56.9 73.2 65.2 46.7 6.2 67.8 61.2 60.9 63.4 39.1 23.9
4) Boats 2.5 5.1 9.4 8.7 0.4 3.6 0.7 2.9 6.9 4.7 7.6 4.3 13.4 1.8 6.5 9.1 11.2 3.3 2.2
5) Buses & Motor Coaches 47.5 38.4 37.7 10.5 55.8 23.6 85.9 32.6 48.2 35.9 41.3 21.0 28.3 42.0 38.0 64.5 26.1 27.5
6) Construction & Mining 79.0 78.3 26.4 89.5 69.2 83.7 73.6 87.7 75.7 81.9 24.6 69.9 86.2 78.6 89.9 67.4 72.5
7) Computers 99.3 32.2 83.3 40.9 45.7 97.1 94.2 98.2 80.4 15.2 59.1 96.7 99.6 63.8 91.3 48.6
8) Copiers & Fax Machines 31.2 82.6 39.5 44.9 97.5 93.1 98.6 79.7 15.9 58.3 96.0 100.0 62.7 90.6 49.3
9) Energy 22.8 21.4 22.5 27.9 19.6 29.3 12.3 1.4 28.6 27.2 31.5 23.2 15.6 8.3
10) Forklifts 44.2 55.1 76.4 84.8 85.1 61.6 24.3 64.1 77.5 83.0 65.9 75.0 76.8
11) Logging & Forestry 52.2 37.0 36.2 38.8 29.7 5.8 57.6 36.6 39.9 53.3 25.4 67.0
12) Medium/Light Duty Trucks 40.6 50.4 42.4 43.8 18.1 62.3 47.8 45.3 84.1 29.0 56.5
13) Medical 91.7 95.7 74.6 18.8 53.6 94.9 97.8 58.0 88.8 43.5
14) Manufacturing 93.8 88.4 13.0 51.8 94.6 93.5 73.9 84.4 51.1
15) Office 77.2 14.5 55.4 95.3 98.9 59.4 89.1 46.4
16) Printing & Photographic 26.8 30.8 85.5 80.1 54.3 66.7 62.0
17) Railroad 12.7 13.8 16.3 12.0 10.1 20.3
18) Real Estate 52.9 58.7 65.6 37.3 25.7
19) Retail 96.4 69.6 92.8 44.6
20) Telecommunications 63.0 90.9 49.6
21) Trucks 46.0 48.9
22) Vending 34.8
23) Waste & Refuse Handling
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Figure 1: Bureau Entry Timing and Market Concentration 
 
This figure plots the timing of lenders’ bureau entry as a function of home and new market 
concentration. The left (right) axis measures the fraction of lenders entering the bureau that 
year (Home and New Market HHI). See Appendix A for variables definitions. 
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Figure 2: Stock of Bureau Information by Collateral Type 
 
This figure plots the growth in bureau information coverage for the five most common 
collateral types in our sample (copiers and fax machines, trucks, construction and mining 
equipment, agricultural equipment, and computers). Collateral types are summarized in Table 
A1. Each series measures the growth in number of open contracts in the bureau that year as a 
percentage of the maximum all time open contracts in the bureau for the collateral type. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table describes the exposures for lenders in our sample. The unit of observation is a lender, 
and all variables except Home Market HHI and New Market HHI are measured at the quarter 
before bureau entry. Home Market HHI and New Market HHI are measured at PayNet’s 
launch. See Appendix A for variables definitions.     
   
 
Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75% N
Lender Features at Entry
Average Contract Size ($) 190,692 273,269 41,445 76,308 223,081 207
Credit ($ thousands) 55,015 153,625 603 3,356 26,400 207
# Contracts 481.9 1,287.9 8.0 32.0 169.0 207
# Collateral Types 5.2 5.1 1.0 3.0 8.0 207
# Markets 18.7 26.1 3.0 8.0 25.0 207
Lease Share 0.75 0.40 0.48 1.00 1.00 207
Home Market HHI 0.24 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.28 207
New Market HHI 0.30 0.05 0.27 0.28 0.29 207
Home Market Delinquency 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.22 207
New Market Delinquency 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.18 207
Home Market Growth 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.08 207
New Market Growth 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.04 207
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Table 2: Time to Bureau Entry and Market, Lender, and Bureau Characteristics  
 
This table uses OLS to estimate the time to bureau entry as a function of market, lender, and 
bureau characteristics. The dependent variable is the number of years remaining before the 
lender enters the bureau (Time to Entry). The sample begins in 1999 and ends when the lender 
enters the bureau (no post-entry observations are included). The unit of observation is a lender-
year. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered 
at the lender level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. See Appendix A for variables definitions. 
 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time to Time to Time to Time to Time to
Entry Entry Entry Entry Entry
Home Market HHI 1.891* 1.768* 1.676* 1.613* 1.475*
[1.94] [1.86] [1.75] [1.90] [1.84]
New Market HHI -53.601*** -44.877*** -55.248*** -36.108*** -36.693***
[-4.83] [-6.08] [-6.60] [-5.39] [-5.82]
Home Market Delinquency -0.753 -0.802 -1.398** -1.567**
[-0.93] [-0.99] [-2.38] [-2.44]
New Market Delinquency -47.922*** -55.034*** -49.301*** -50.446***
[-12.60] [-13.40] [-12.87] [-13.26]
Home Market Growth 0.054** 0.046** 0.047**
[2.30] [2.09] [2.17]
New Market Growth 11.501*** 10.125*** 9.778***
[4.08] [4.00] [4.00]
Log Collateral Types -0.687** -0.466*
[-2.32] [-1.77]
Log Credit -0.412*** -0.307***
[-3.33] [-2.62]
Lease Share -2.065*** -1.737***
[-4.96] [-4.41]
Log Regions 0.233 0.197
[0.71] [0.66]
Log Member Count -0.785***
[-10.86]
Adj R-Sq. 0.470 0.510 0.518 0.578 0.625
N 2,114 2,114 2,114 2,114 2,114
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3: Information Sharing and Lender Exposures 
 
This table models lender exposures as a function of bureau membership using specification (1). 
The dependent variable in column 1 is the log dollar amount of credit (Log Credit). The 
dependent variable in column 2 is the log number of markets (Log Markets), where markets 
are defined as unique collateral type-region pairs. Member is an indicator variable equal to one 
for quarters after the lender has joined the bureau. The sample spans the two years surrounding 
the lender’s entry to the bureau (i.e., four quarters before and four quarters after the entry). The 
unit of observation is a lender-quarter. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics 
calculated with standard errors clustered at the lender level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Log Log 
Credit Markets
Member 0.221*** 0.085***
[5.32] [4.51]
Adj R-Sq. 0.966 0.967
N 1,605 1,605
Lender FEs Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes
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Table 4: Exposure Responses to Information Coverage 
 
This table models how lender exposures respond to changes in bureau information coverage 
using specification (2). The dependent variable is the log dollar amount of credit (Log Credit) 
for a given collateral type-region in the lender’s portfolio that quarter. Member is an indicator 
variable equal to one for quarters after the lender has joined the bureau. Coverage is the log 
number of open contracts appearing in the bureau that quarter for a given collateral type-region. 
The sample is restricted to collateral types that the lender was exposed to before joining. The 
unit of observation is at the lender-collateral type-region-quarter level. Reported below the 
coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the lender level. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
    
(1) (2)
Log Log 
Credit Credit
Coverage 0.009
[0.40]
Member x Coverage 0.105*** 0.115***
[3.96] [4.62]
Adj R-Sq. 0.697 0.695
N 170,847 170,847
Lender x Collateral Type FEs Yes Yes
Lender x Quarter FEs Yes Yes
Region x Collateral Type FEs Yes No
Region x Collateral Type x Quarter FEs Yes
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Table 5: Exposure Responses to Information Coverage by Market Type 
 
This table uses equation (2) to examine how our Table 4, column 2, results depend on the nature 
of the collateral type-region market being studied. The dependent variable is the log dollar 
amount of credit for a given collateral type-region in the lender’s portfolio (Log Credit). 
Member is an indicator variable equal to one for quarters after the lender has joined the bureau. 
Coverage is the log number of open contracts appearing in the bureau that quarter for a given 
collateral type-region. The sample is restricted to collateral types that the lender was exposed 
to before joining. Columns 1–4 split our sample according to whether the market is a home or 
new market for the lender and whether the market has above or below median HHI. The unit 
of observation is at the lender-collateral type-region-quarter level. Reported below the 
coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the lender level. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Log Log Log 
Credit Credit Credit Credit
Home, New, Home, New,
Low HHI Low HHI High HHI High HHI
Member x Coverage 0.033 0.096** 0.076 0.139**
[0.43] [2.30] [1.29] [2.51]
Adj R-Sq. 0.785 0.656 0.672 0.631
N 37,061 51,098 32,577 50,111
Lender x Collateral Type FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Collateral Type x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: Collateral Type Relatedness 
 
This table presents the most and least related collateral types, according to our index. * indicates significance in relatedness between two collateral 
types at the 10% level. 
 
 
Collateral Type Most Related Second Most Related Third Most Related Least Related
Agricultural Real Estate* Construction & Mining* Trucks Boats
Aircraft Boats Trucks Computers Energy
Automobiles Manufacturing Construction & Mining Medium/Light Duty Trucks Boats
Boats Aircraft Railroad Trucks Energy
Buses & Motor Coaches Medium/Light Duty Trucks Trucks Manufacturing Boats
Construction & Mining Agricultural* Trucks Forklifts Boats
Computers Telecommunications* Copiers & Fax Machines* Office* Boats
Copiers & Fax Machines Telecommunications* Copiers & Fax Machines* Office* Boats
Energy Agricultural Telecommunications Office Boats
Forklifts Construction & Mining Agricultural Manufacturing Boats
Logging & Forestry Agricultural Construction & Mining Waste & Refuse Handling Boats
Medium/Light Duty Trucks Agricultural Construction & Mining Trucks Boats
Medical Telecommunications* Office* Retail* Boats
Manufacturing Retail* Computers* Office* Boats
Office Telecommunications* Copiers & Fax Machines* Computers* Boats
Printing & Photographic Manufacturing Retail Construction Boats
Railroad Aircraft Printing & Photographic Construction Energy
Real Estate Agricultural* Construction & Mining Automobiles Boats
Retail Computer* Telecommunications* Copiers & Fax Machines* Boats
Telecommunications Copiers & Fax Machines* Computers* Office* Boats
Trucks Construction & Mining Agricultural Medium/Light Duty Trucks Boats
Vending Retail* Computers* Copiers & Fax Machines* Boats
Waste & Refuse Handling Forklifts Construction & Mining Logging Boats
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Table 7: New Collateral Exposure, Collateral Relatedness, and Bureau Information 
 
This table uses equation (3) to model lender exposures within a new collateral type as a function 
of relatedness to existing collateral types in the lender’s portfolio, bureau membership, and 
bureau information coverage. The dependent variable is the log dollar amount of credit for a 
given collateral type in the lender’s portfolio (Log Credit). Relatedness is measured as the 
maximum of the pairwise relatedness scores between the lender’s existing collateral types and 
the given collateral type. Member is an indicator variable equal to one for the period after the 
lender has joined the bureau. Coverage is the log number of open contracts appearing in the 
bureau that quarter for a given collateral type. Column 3 includes all main and two-way effects 
not subsumed by our fixed effects but does not report them for brevity. The sample is restricted 
to new collateral—collateral types that the lender was not exposed to before entering the 
bureau. The unit of observation is at the lender-collateral type-quarter level. Reported below 
the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the lender level. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
  
 
(1) (2) (3)
Log Log Log
Credit Credit Credit
Relatedness 0.912***
[5.59]
Member x Relatedness 0.767*** 0.653*** -0.186
[6.27] [7.24] [-0.72]
Member x Relatedness x Coverage 0.678**
[2.24]
Adj R-Sq. 0.363 0.726 0.727
N 186,789 186,789 186,789
Collateral Type FEs Yes No No
Lender x Collateral Type FEs No Yes Yes
Lender x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: Information Sharing and Exposures by Lender Size and Focus 
 
This table uses equation (1) to model lender exposures as a function of bureau membership, 
lender size, and lender focus. The dependent variable in Panel A and B is the log dollar amount 
of credit in the lender’s portfolio (Log Credit) and the share of the lender’s clients in the 
smallest quartile of total credit within the collateral type-quarter (Small Client Share), 
respectively. Member is an indicator variable equal to one for quarters after the lender has 
joined the bureau. Large Lender is an indicator variable equal to one for lenders with above 
median total credit. # Collateral Types is the log number of collateral types in the lender’s 
portfolio. Column 5 includes Lender Size-Year FEs and Lender Focus-Year FEs. Both Lender 
Size and Lender Focus are categories defined at the median. The sample spans the two years 
surrounding the lender’s entry to the bureau. The unit of observation is at the lender-quarter 
level. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered 
at the lender level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. See Appendix A for variables definitions. 
 
Panel A: Log Credit 
  
  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Log Log Log Log
Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit
Member 0.221*** 0.333*** 0.417*** 0.449*** 0.400***
[5.32] [4.49] [5.28] [5.17] [4.65]
Member x Large Lender -0.225** -0.173* -0.194**
[-2.44] [-1.83] [-2.18]
Member x # Collateral Types -0.200*** -0.144*** -0.084**
[-3.82] [-2.78] [-2.34]
Adj R-Sq. 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966
N 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605
Lender FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Lender Size x Year FEs No No No No Yes
Lender Focus x Year FEs No No No No Yes
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Panel B: Exposure to Small Firms 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Small Small Small Small Small 
Client Share Client Share Client Share Client Share Client Share
Member -0.009 -0.021 -0.013 -0.018 -0.021
[-1.06] [-1.52] [-0.92] [-1.13] [-1.21]
Member x Large Lender 0.025* 0.027* 0.033*
[1.76] [1.90] [1.96]
Member x # Collateral Types 0.004 -0.004 -0.005
[0.60] [-0.94] [-1.30]
Adj R-Sq. 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848
N 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605
Lender FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Lender Size x Year FEs No No No No Yes
Lender Focus x Year FEs No No No No Yes
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Table 9: Information Sharing and Borrower Credit Access 
 
This table models a borrower’s access to credit as a function of whether its credit file is 
available in the bureau. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the borrower’s log 
number of lending relationships (Log # of Lending Relationships) and log total credit (Log 
Borrower Credit), respectively. The dependent variable in column 3 is an indicator variable for 
whether the borrower starts a new relationship without having an old contract maturing in that 
quarter or a surrounding quarter (Starts New Relationship Off Cycle). Post File is an indicator 
equal to one for the period after the borrower first appears in the bureau. The unit of observation 
is at the borrower-quarter level. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with 
standard errors clustered at the borrower level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variables definitions. 
 
    
(1) (2) (3)
Log # Log Starts New
of Lending Borrower Relationship
Relationships Credit Off Cycle
Post File 0.060*** 0.118*** 0.007***
[17.94] [6.75] [4.75]
Adj R-Sq. 0.675 0.747 0.009
N 674,985 674,985 674,985
Borrower FEs Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes
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Table A1: Collateral Type Exposures 
 
This table summarizes the number of lenders with contracts for each collateral type.  
 
 
Collateral Type # Lenders
Agricultural 67
Aircraft 16
Automobiles 56
Boats 9
Buses & Motor Coaches 40
Construction & Mining 110
Computers 101
Copiers & Fax Machines 53
Energy 9
Forklifts 50
Logging & Forestry 30
Medium/Light Duty Trucks 67
Medical 79
Manufacturing 97
Office 73
Printing & Photographic 53
Railroad 16
Real Estate 20
Retail 99
Telecommunications 69
Trucks 121
Vending 49
Waste & Refuse Handling 37
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Table A2: Time to Bureau Entry—Robustness 
 
This table presents robustness analyses for our Table 2 tests. The dependent variable is the 
number of years remaining before the lender enters the bureau (Time to Entry). The sample 
begins in 1999 and ends when the lender enters the bureau. Column 1 restricts the sample to 
lenders joining in 2004 or later, reducing the number of observations to 1,967. Column 2 
reports the average coefficients and t-statistics from 1,000 trials of a placebo analysis, where 
we counterfactually assign lenders to random entry years. Column 3 defines the lender’s home 
and new markets using their exposures in the second quarter of 2001. The unit of observation 
is a lender-year. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors 
clustered at the lender level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variables definitions. 
 
     
(1) (2) (3)
Time to Time to Time to
Entry Entry Entry
Home Market HHI 1.270* -0.124 2.378**
[1.66] [-0.10] [1.98]
New Market HHI -24.510** -1.407 -16.212**
[-2.06] [-0.13] [-2.06]
Home Market Growth -0.006 0.000 0.007
[-0.17] [0.02] [0.20]
New Market Growth -2.376 0.021 4.473***
[-0.39] [0.14] [3.83]
Home Market Delinquency -1.756*** -0.101 -3.133***
[-2.84] [-0.04] [-3.91]
New Market Delinquency -90.529*** 0.342 -48.886***
[-19.01] [0.07] [-12.09]
Log Collateral Types -0.244 0.023 -0.568**
[-0.98] [0.05] [-2.11]
Log Credit -0.197* 0.009 -0.374***
[-1.84] [0.07] [-2.92]
Lease Share -1.663*** 0.026 -1.727***
[-4.33] [0.04] [-4.28]
Log Regions 0.323 0.006 0.365
[1.14] [0.01] [1.25]
Log Member Count -0.772*** 0.008 -0.739***
[-10.74] [0.03] [-10.47]
Adj R-Sq. 0.681 0.618
N 1,967 2,114
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
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Table A3: Contract and State Exposure Responses to Information Coverage 
 
This table presents robustness analyses of our Table 4, column 2 results. The dependent 
variable in column 1 and 2 is the log number of contracts (Log Contracts) and log number of 
state exposures (Log States), respectively, for a given collateral type-region in the lender’s 
portfolio. Member is an indicator equal to one for quarters after the lender has joined the 
bureau. Coverage is the log number of open contracts appearing in the bureau that quarter for 
a given collateral type-region. The sample is restricted to collateral types that the lender was 
exposed to before joining. The unit of observation is lender-collateral type-region-quarter. 
Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the 
lender level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. See Appendix A for variables definitions. 
 
  
(1) (2)
Log Log 
Contracts States
Member x Coverage 0.099*** 0.015***
[5.84] [3.11]
Adj R-Sq. 0.745 0.630
N 170,847 170,847
Lender x Collateral Type FEs Yes Yes
Lender x Quarter FEs Yes Yes
Region x Collateral Type x Quarter FEs Yes Yes
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Table A4: Exposure Responses to Information Coverage—Robustness 
 
This table presents robustness analyses of our Table 4, column 2, results. The dependent 
variable is the log dollar amount of credit for a given collateral type-region in the lender’s 
portfolio (Log Credit). Member is an indicator variable equal to one for quarters after the lender 
has joined the bureau. Coverage Placebo is the log number of open contracts excluding 
collateral type j appearing in the bureau that region-quarter. Stale Coverage is the log number 
of open contracts appearing in the bureau four quarters ago for a given collateral type-region. 
Coverage is the log number of open contracts appearing in the bureau that quarter for a given 
collateral type-region. The sample is restricted to collateral types that the lender was exposed 
to before joining. Column 3 excludes the five largest lenders; columns 4 and 5 split the sample 
according to when the lender joined the bureau. The unit of observation is at the lender-
collateral type-quarter level. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with 
standard errors clustered at the lender level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variables definitions. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Log Log Log Log 
Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit
Full Full Drop 5 Entry Entry
Sample Sample Largest <=2003 >2003
Member x Coverage Placebo -0.204
[-0.80]
Member x Stale Coverage 0.084***
[3.53]
Member x Coverage 0.115*** 0.104** 0.086**
[3.75] [2.20] [2.55]
Adj R-Sq. 0.694 0.695 0.683 0.696 0.664
N 170,847 170,847 137,042 83,438 87,409
Lender x Collateral Type FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Collateral Type x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
